New Crashworthiness Decision Huge Win For Consumers

In a case of first impression the Florida Supreme Court held that principles of comparative fault as to the cause of the underlying crash will not generally apply in crashworthiness or enhanced injury cases. D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WL 1472600 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2001). Crashworthiness cases, "which are also often referred to as `secondary collision' or 'enhanced injury' cases, involve both an initial accident and a subsequent or secondary collision caused by an alleged defective condition created by a manufacturer, which is unrelated to the cause of the initial accident but which causes additional and distinct injuries beyond those suffered in the primary collision." D'Amario at 1. Florida adopted the crashworthiness doctrine in 1976 in Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So.2d 201, 202 (Fla. 1976), when it held that "a manufacturer of automobiles may be held liable under certain conditions for a design or manufacturing defect which causes injury but is not the cause of the primary collision." However, until D'Amario, it was not clear whether or how principles of comparative fault should apply in crashworthiness cases.

In D'Amario, a passenger was injured when the car in which he was riding collided with a tree and burst into flames. The driver was allegedly intoxicated and speeding at the time. The plaintiffs did not seek to recover from Ford for the injuries caused by the initial collision with the tree. Instead, they sought to recover for the injuries caused by the fire. At trial, the court ruled that Ford could pursue an apportionment defense and submit evidence of the driver's actions in causing the initial collision. Faced with that ruling, the parties stipulated to the jury that the driver's negligence and excessive speed caused the initial accident, and that his blood alcohol level was .14 percent. The jury returned a defense verdict. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for new trial stating it erred in allowing evidence of the driver's alcohol content to go to the jury because it caused "undue emphasis to be placed on alcohol as a primary cause of the injury." Ford appealed and the Second District reversed.

The Second District's decision in D'Amario conflicted with the Third District's decision in Nash v. General Motors Corp., 734 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). In Nash, a driver with a blood alcohol level of .15 percent crossed the center line and crashed into the car that Maria Nash was driving. Nash's head struck the A-pillar, the metal post that separates the driver's door from the windshield and she died as a result of her head injury. Nash's estate sued General Motors, the manufacturer of the vehicle Nash was driving and alleged a seatbelt failure. The trial court denied the estate's request to exclude evidence of the other driver's intoxication and the jury found that General Motors was not liable. On appeal the estate argued that evidence of the other driver's intoxication was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to the issue of whether Nash's vehicle had a defective seatbelt. The Third District agreed.

In considering whether principles of comparative fault should apply, the Florida Supreme Court considered both the "majority view" and the "minority view." The majority view is that "the fault of the person causing the accident that created the circumstances in which the second accident occurred should be compared with the role of the automobile manufacturer's negligence in designing a defective product in assessing total responsibility for the claimant's injuries." D'Amario at 5 (citations omitted). The minority view is that in crashworthiness cases, responsibility for damages is apportioned by the limitation of a manufacturer's liability to only those damages caused by the defective product. D'Amario at 7. The Supreme Court adopted the minority view.

The Court explained that "crashworthiness cases may be analogized to medical malpractice cases involving a successive negligent medical provider who is alleged to have either aggravated an existing injury or caused a separate and additional injury. Thus, just as the injury-causing fault of the patient ... [is] not relevant in assessing the doctor's subsequent and separate negligence, the accident-causing fault of the driver would not be relevant in crashworthiness cases in assessing a manufacturer's neglect in designing an automobile or its parts." Id at 10. The Florida Supreme Court pointed out that the defendants in D'Amario and Nash were allowed to "effectively shift the focus of the trial from the existence of a defect to the driver's conduct in driving while intoxicated, (footnote omitted) even though the existence of a defect was the fundamental liability issue to be tried in these cases." Id. at 14. The rule adopted in D'Amario will ensure fairness in apportionment of damages, and will prevent the jury from being unduly confused, especially in cases where the accidents involved drinking and driving. Instead, the jury will properly focus on whether a defect caused enhanced or secondary injuries. Id.

D'Amario's Impact on Other Crashworthiness Cases

The D'Amario decision will have a profound effect on numerous cases where a defective condition in the vehicle is alleged to have caused additional or enhanced injuries. Examples of these kinds of cases include:

• cases involving seatbelt failure in which an occupant's suffers injuries due to a defective seatbelt;
• rollover cases where an occupant is crushed by a vehicle's roof which fails during the rollover sequence;
• cases where fuel fed fire erupts after a crash burning occupants in the vehicle;
• cases in which vehicle occupants are ejected from a window because of the auto manufacturer's failure to use laminated "safety" glass; and
• defective seat back cases in which occupants are injured due to poorly designed seats.

These are but a few of the types of cases in which manufacturers have routinely defended the cases by arguing that under principles of comparative fault the jury should apportion all or most of the fault to the driver or tortfeasor who caused the initial accident. Under D'Amario this defense tactic will no longer be allowed, and the product's crashworthiness will now be properly decided by the jury solely on the merits of the product.