Fuel-fed fires generally rely upon crashworthiness or “second-crash” theories. Generally, these cases involve bodily injury or wrongful death claims which revolve around the argument that but for the preventable post-accident fire the alleged injury or death would not have occurred. For example, assume your client’s vehicle experiences a rear-tire separation as a result of a tire defect, which results in a loss of control and an impact with a tree. Thereafter, the vehicle is engulfed in flames and your client is horribly burned before he or she is pulled to safety. While the initial separation may well form the basis of a lawsuit and allow you to claim damages related to the initial impact, the secondary post-accident fire and burn related injuries would form an independent action against the automotive manufacturer. That claim, relating to the ability of that vehicle’s fuel system to prevent fires in foreseeable accidents, is a crashworthiness claim at its core, and triggers the application of D’Amario and its prodigy. In D’Amario v. Ford Motor Company, the Florida Supreme Court defined crashworthiness cases as follows: [Crashworthiness cases] which are also often referred to as “secondary collision” or “enhanced injury” cases, involve both an initial accident and a subsequent or secondary collision caused by an alleged defective condition created by a manufacturer, which is unrelated to the cause of the initial accident, but which causes additional and distinct injuries beyond those suffered in the primary collision.¹ In most instances, cases involving fuel-fed fires strictly involve crashworthiness issues relating to the failure of the vehicle to protect its occupants or others from fuel induced fire after a foreseeable accident. Many states recognize this distinction between crashworthiness of a vehicle and initial accidents.

Defense experts will generally acknowledge and agree with the basic principle that should the vehicle’s occupants survive the initial crash, they should not be seriously injured or killed in a fire due to a failure in a vehicle’s fuel system. However, those same experts will argue that a manufacturer met the standard of care by complying with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 301.² While this argument can be convincing to jurors, it can be attacked as a minimal standard. In fact, there is overwhelming documentation to support the argument that FMVSS 301 was and has always been intended as a minimum safety standard, which does not obviate a manufacturer’s duty to ensure the crashworthiness of its vehicles through tests and design. FMVSS 301 only requires certification by manufacturers that their vehicles will not leak more than an ounce of fluid per minute after running the vehicle into a fixed barrier at speeds up to 30 mph. Some manufacturers have increased the speed to 35 and 40 mph so that they are able to argue they have exceeded the requirements. The problem is that FMVSS 301 is not a realistic test. Most crashes involve other vehicles, higher speeds, rollovers, or other circumstances, which are not addressed by FMVSS 301. Therefore, the responsibility remains with the manufacturer to ensure the vehicle’s fuel system is reasonably safe for its intended purpose. Mere compliance with or conformity to FMVSS 301 neither makes a vehicle “safe” nor satisfies a manufacturer’s duty. In fact, the National Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) conducted a study entitled “Motor Vehicle Fires in Traffic Crashes and the Effects of Fuel System Integrity Standard”, NHTSA Report Number DOT HS 807 675, November 1990, that showed FMVSS 301 has not significantly reduced the number of fatalities resulting from vehicle fires since its enactment.

Fuel-fed fires can result from any number of design flaws or manufacturing defects, but traditionally the theories have fallen into three categories: placement of the fuel tank, siphoning failures and filler neck designs.

General Motor’s side-saddle gas tank design is one of the most notable examples of litigation involving placement of the fuel tank. In their C/K truck platform, General Motors designed and installed the fuel tanks outside of the vehicle’s frame rails from 1973 until 1987. Prior to this vehicle platform, General Motors incorporated the tank inside the frame rails. Although all Big Three auto-manufacturers considered placement of the fuel outside the frame rails, General Motors was the only one to put it into production. This design was specifically rejected by Chrysler engineers due to a concern about the high probability of leakage after a side impact. Although General Motors’ engineers showed the same concerns, they were overruled by the corporation’s desire to provide consumers with a 40-gallon fuel capacity. The “side-saddle” label came from the option of having a second 20-gallon tank placed on the passenger side of the vehicle, while the other was placed along the driver’s side.

By mounting the tanks outside the frame rails, they were allegedly subject to rupture and puncture during collisions. Unfortunately, the design was utilized in over 10 million trucks. Studies suggest that more than 1,800 people have died in fuel-fed fires due to this design. General Motors’ own documents show that the co-pay estimated that it would have cost General Motors an additional $2.20 per vehicle to protect the occupants from these kinds of fuel-fed fires.³

In 1992, the Center for Auto Safety and Public Citizen filed a petition with NHTSA to recall these vehicles. General Motors responded to the inquiry by defending the design of their fuel system, and later, in 1993, General Motors refused to voluntarily recall these vehicles and again defended their side-saddle tanks. The Secretary of Transportation initially concluded that there was a defect relating to the tanks’ placement and that General Motors knew about it, but later reversed his decision 6 weeks later.⁴ Ultimately, General Motors signed an agreement negotiated by the Justice Department committing $51 million to programs to research and promote safety in exchange for closing the investigation. General Motors is still embroiled in litigation involving this vehicle platform nationwide involving deaths and injuries as a result from their side-saddle fuel tank design. The ability to bring an action regarding this vehicle platform is quickly coming to an end in the State of Florida because of the 12-year statute of repose, however, the vehicles are commonly found throughout the state and fires are still occurring. Still, to this day, General Motors has never recalled this vehicle.

A second theory involves “siphoning” or flow of the gasoline out of the tank or fuel system due to a break or rupture in the fuel lines, whether caused by gravity or other pressures. A compromise of the fuel line can occur during or after a collision, and can result from fatigue, impact or corrosion. The concern, of course, is that once siphoned fuel is allowed to escape the system it can be ignited by any number of potential ignition sources, from sparks created by metal scraping on asphalt to electrical arcs. Because of this known risk, it is imperative that the systems incorporate designs and counter-measures to prevent fuel siphoning. Like cases involving the improper placement of the fuel tank(s), siphoning cases have jury appeal, as the technical aspects of these cases are generally susceptible to simplification for presentation to the trier of fact. Further, these cases often gain jury appeal for the fact that the costs associated with incorporating a safer design is usually nominal. When costs become the driving factor in corporate decision-making, and such decisions endanger consumers, juries are more apt to seriously question why the manufacturer would not take steps to prevent it.

A number of preventative counter-measures, or “alternative designs,” are available to address this known problem. The most effective is to protect the integrity of the fuel system so that breaks cannot occur during collisions or impacts. Another method is utilizing an anti-siphoning device that would prevent leakage of fuel from the tank itself. For example, the 1985 General Motors’ CK truck platform incorporated a ball-valve that would prevent leakage of fuel from the sending unit of the fuel tank. It is a simple design, and GM’s utilization of these valves in the CK truck platform helped to address the known risk of escaping fuel as a result of siphoning.

A third theory to look for in any vehicle fire case involves the filler neck of the fuel system. The filler neck is the component just inside your fuel door where you place the gas nozzle to fill up your vehicle. It is usually made of plastic or metal and the fuel cap screws inside of its opening. The filler neck is attached to the fuel tank of most vehicles via a rubber hose. If the fuel cap is loosened or blown off in an accident or collision, or simply is lost, there may be nothing to prevent the loss of fuel from the tank through the filler neck. This is a typical scenario seen in roll-over events. The use of a check valve can easily prevent the loss of fuel during such rollover accidents, regardless of whether or not the fuel cap or filler neck compromised. A check valve is simply a device that prevents the back flow of fuel from the tank after the line is compromised. Check valves are not new, and viable designs have been available since the 1960’s. Manufacturers have known the importance of protecting the integrity of their vehicle’s fuel systems during rollover type accidents for decades. Use of check valves to prevent fuel loss during roll-overs is inexpensive and has become commonplace since the late 1990’s.

When investigating vehicle fires, it is important to thoroughly review the history of the subject vehicle. It is always recommended to query available sources of information, like NHTSA or other attorneys, to see if fuel system deficiencies have been found to exist in the past. However, even without such a history, if a post-collision fire caused catastrophic injuries, the vehicle should be thoroughly inspected to determine why the fire occurred. Unfortunately, many potential cases and theories surrounding vehicle fires are simply overlooked due to incomplete investigations. Because vehicle fires continue to occur as the result of design and manufacturing defects, consumer lawyers should be vigilant in examining all cases in which clients are injured for potential defect issues.

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1 See D’Amario v. Ford Motor Company, 806 So.2d 424 (Fla 2001)

2 See 49 CFR §§568.1 – 568.6 (2001)

3 “Value Analysis of Auto Fuel Fed Fire Related Fatalities”, Edward C. Ivey, June 29, 1973.

4 The Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pena, made this decision because the NHTSA administrator had earlier recused himself due to earlier working as a consultant for General Motors.